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Abstract 
Business incubators are an increasingly popular tool for promoting job and wealth 
creation. Yet given the heterogeneity of incubation models, it is not always clear how 
incubators operate, what their main characteristics are and how can they best 
contribute to job and wealth creation. If technology is central in promoting economic 
growth and new firm creation the crucial mechanism in transferring new knowledge 
to markets, then technology incubators have the biggest potential to contribute to 
economic growth. We define technology incubators by their strategic choices in terms 
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of mission, linkages to universities and geographical location. We investigate their 
nature by comparing the levels of business services provision, selection criteria, exit 
policy and tenants’ characteristics. Our sample includes 12 incubators located in six 
Northwestern European countries and a total of 101 incubated companies. Data were 
collected in both incubators and among their tenants. Results show that technology 
incubators provide more tenants with their services, select younger companies and 
practice stricter exit policies. Additionally, they tend to attract more experienced 
teams of entrepreneurs. Our main contribution is a better understanding of the 
technology incubators impact against the remainder population of business 
incubators. We speculate that incubators not focused in incubating technology might 
not be fostering company creation and therefore not actively contributing to growth. 
Further, the low levels of service provision are both a product and a consequence of 
slack selection criteria and weak exit policies. Finally, we discuss the implications of 
our findings to business incubator managers, policy makers and prospective tenants. 
 
Keywords: Business Incubators, Technology Incubation, Business Support, 
Entrepreneurship, Economic Growth 
 
2/26 
1 Introduction 
Explaining, modelling and controlling economic growth as long been an ambition of 
researchers, practitioners and policy makers (Landes, 1998; Maddison, 2001; Smith, 
1776). In the 1950s, Robert Solow first attempted to explain economic growth 
(Solow, 1956) by putting technical progress central in the creation of wealth of 
advanced economies. Today, the notion that technology change is responsible for 
economic growth is widespread (Romer, 1990). According to this view, growth is 
driven by technological change created endogenously and intentionally by purposed 
investments in the creation of knowledge. More recently, Audretsch (2007) suggested 
the mechanism thought which new knowledge is brought to the market, creating new 
products and services, is entrepreneurship. This definition, presuming the creation of 
new firms, is in line with the traditional view of entrepreneurship (e.g. Low and 
MacMillan, 1988). The larger of technology based firms, more externalities will be in 
generating and exploring new knowledge and therefore the faster the economy will 
grow. It becomes apparent that promoting economic growth should include 
appropriate tools for supporting creation of new knowledge. Further, all mechanisms 
able to transform that output into new marketable products and services should also 
be among the policies to create jobs and wealth. 
One of the most famous initiatives to bridge the gap between the creation of new 
knowledge and marketing new products and services is the Small Business 
Innovation Research (SBIR). The SBIR program started in 1982 as a direct 
instrument to stimulate technological innovation among small business in the United 
States (Wessner, 2008) and link universities to public and private markets. Also, 
SBIR is a tool for promoting commercialization of innovation within the private 
sector, which is mostly achieved by the creation of firms (Wessner, 2008). In fact, a 
significant number of firms would not have started without the SBIR initiative 
(Audretsch et al., 2002). Business incubation assumes itself to bridge the same gap 
yet having a significant difference compared to the SBIR. 
Business incubators (BI) are organizations which support actively the process of 
creation of new companies. Governments have been vigorously supporting business 
incubators in the past decades as tool to promote economic growth (Adkins, 2002; 
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EC, 2002). BIs provide nascent and fledgling companies with an array of services 
such as infrastructure, business support and access to networks (NBIA, 2007; OECD, 
1997; UKBI, 2007). The basic mechanism behind BI operation is similar to that of 
SBIR - to bridge the gap between the creation of new knowledge and marketing new 
products and services. However, BIs go further by guiding the new firms during their 
early stages of development.  
BIs can be differentiated along various lines. For example, Grimaldi and Grandi 
(2005) divide BIs according to whether they are privately or publicly owned. Others 
attempts have been made using more dimensions to characterize types of BIs, such as 
strategic choice (Carayannis and von Zedtwitz, 2005), service portfolio (von Zedtwitz 
and Grimaldi, 2006) or management features (Aerts et al., 2007; Clarysse et al., 
2005). However, the outcomes of BIs in terms of job and wealth creation are not 
present in any of these typologies. In fact, most of these studies lack a business 
incubation theory lens (Hackett and Dilts, 2004).  
The strong theoretical and empirical link between innovation and economic growth 
suggests that BIs particularly focused on the support of technology based firms could 
be an effective policy tool. Previous differentiations do not capture so much the idea 
of technology business incubators (TIs). The closest category would be the 
university-based BIs (Grimaldi and Grandi, 2005; von Zedtwitz and Grimaldi, 2006), 
in which provision of both tangible and intangible assets is conceptualized. Although 
TIs have also deserved some attention of researchers, studies seldom operationalize 
the process of business incubation or business incubation features (cf. Chan and Lau, 
2005; Colombo and Delmastro, 2002; Mian, 1996, , 1997) 1.This contributes to the 
poor current understanding of the differences between TIs and non technology based 
business incubators (NTBI).  
We argue that BIs have a potential effect on economic growth; yet their contribution 
will only be meaningful if the process of incubation is itself successful. As proxy for 
the success of the incubation process, we take the level of services provided to tenants 
in each BI. Tenants’ needs are similar to the needs of every nascent company. If the 
BI is not providing a high level of services its tenants, it transpires that the BI is not 
contributing actively to the development of its tenants. In other words, if the tenants 
do not have access to a service portfolio, they are as good as outside the BI.  
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We set out to investigate the differences between TIs and NTBIs comparing each 
group level of services provided to tenants. The comparison will be made using 
business incubation dimensions, such as provision of infrastructure, business support 
and access to networks. We will also investigate their selection strategy as well as 
tenant firms’ characteristics.  
This paper is structured as follows. We start by discussing characteristics of BI in 
general and TI in particular. Also, we provide a solid theoretical lens to business 
incubation. After outlining our definition of TI, we describe the empirical setting, the 
operationalization of key variables and the method of analysis. After presenting the 
results, we discuss them furthering explanation for the differences between the types 
of BIs. Finally, we discuss the managerial implications for business incubators, policy 
makers and prospective tenants. 
2 The Nature of Business Incubators 
2.1 What are technology business incubators? 
Both practitioners and academics have put forth definitions of business incubators 
(Table 1) (Bergek and Norrman, 2008; EC, 2002; Hackett and Dilts, 2004; Hansen et 
al., 2000; Merrifield, 1987; NBIA, 2007; OECD, 1997; Peters et al., 2004; Phan et al., 
2005; UKBI, 2007). Two key common features can be distilled. First, BIs focus on 
the support of nascent and young companies promoting their growth and maximizing 
their chances of survival. The main goal is that these supported companies will 
survive and thus contribute to creating jobs and wealth. Second, the support services 
are targeted to firms’ needs and consist of physical infrastructure, business support 
services and access to networks. 
++ PUT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE ++ 
TIs are a special type of BI focused on supporting technology based ventures (OECD, 
1997). Knopp (2007) lists TIs among the most frequent self-reported categories 
within the North American population of BIs. We define TI as the BIs which fulfil at 
least two of the following criteria. First, a clear mission statement endorsing the 
creation of technology based new ventures. BIs strategically oriented this way are 
more likely to incubate technology based ventures than their counterparts. Second, 
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TIs have strong links to a research oriented university or other research centres. Such 
BIs are closer to sources of new knowledge and therefore more likely to help creating 
and supporting technology based companies. Lastly, TIs are geographically close to a 
university campus or other research centres. These BIs are more likely to nurture 
university spin-offs due to their location (Audretsch et al., 2005). These three criteria 
ensure that TIs are closer to bridge the gap between knowledge creation and markets. 
Furthermore, TIs will be more prone to engage in technology transfer and therefore 
have a significant contribution to job and wealth creation.  
2.2 Dimensions of business incubation 
Business incubation has three fundamental dimensions: infrastructure, business 
support and access to networks (e.g. Barrow, 2001; Smilor and Gill, 1986). As 
aforementioned, most work on BI is atheoretical (Hackett and Dilts, 2004). We will 
improve the current theoretical foundation of BIs providing arguments why BI can 
have a potential effect on incubatee survival and performance. This will, in its turn, 
have a positive impact on economic growth. 
Infrastructure 
The concept of business incubation is inextricably tied to infrastructure (Phan et al., 
2005). Infrastructure is often associated with space and shared resources. Space is 
generally an office rented to tenants at or below market prices. In addition, BIs often 
have small production facilities or mixed units available to their tenants. Provision of 
space is critical to business incubation. Empirical evidence suggests it as the most 
beneficial feature to tenants (Chan and Lau, 2005), particularly for those in early 
stages of development. General shared resources such as reception, clerical services, 
meeting rooms, conference rooms or car parking (EC, 2002; McAdam and McAdam, 
2008) are often offered together with the space. Specialized shared resources such as 
laboratories or research equipment can also be part of the BI’s infrastructure 
(Grimaldi and Grandi, 2005).  
This typical BI setting providing space together with shared resources impacts 
nascent firms on many levels. First, overhead costs are reduced for the tenants. BIs 
provide their tenants with services they probably would not have easy access to if 
located elsewhere. Car parking, meetings rooms, reception services are examples of 
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this. Also, the burden of planning, setting up and costing a series of individual 
providers is inexistent when tenants enter this kind of ready to use office. Second, 
tenants located inside a BI display a signal of quality and increase their external 
credibility and legitimacy. All BIs have more or less extensive selection procedures. 
This means that being accepted to a BI signals the nascent firm as promising in terms 
of growth. This external legitimacy has a positive impact on young firm’s survival 
even in situations of resource scarcity (Singh et al., 1986). Finally, putting firms 
under the same roof and sharing significant parts of the infrastructure increase the 
chances of synergies between them to arise. Knowledge sharing, formal alliances, 
buyer-seller relationships are examples of these. 
The rationale for infrastructure can be found in the economies of scale. BIs tend to 
have high setup costs, but much lower operating fixed costs and declining marginal 
costs. After a certain space has been built, the operating costs of BI consist mainly on 
the shared resources discussed above. The costs of providing one more tenant with 
the infrastructure (space and shared resources) decrease as the number of tenants 
increases. To a lesser extent, economies of scope are also present when establishing 
and managing a BI. In fact, BIs often bundle infrastructure provision to reduce their 
number of services available within their infrastructure portfolio. Tenants normally 
pay rent for office space including shared resources such as parking, meeting rooms 
and cleaning; shared resources often cannot be paid separately from infrastructure. 
Business support 
New firms often lack experience such as necessary management processes and 
organizational routines to cope with sudden environmental shifts. This results in a 
higher death propensity, particularly in early stages. This “liability of newness” has 
been extensively studied since Stinchcombe coined the term in his 1965 seminal work 
(e.g. Brüderl and Schussler, 1990; Henderson, 1999). The liability of newness can be 
reduced by external credibility (Singh et al., 1986), as discussed in the infrastructure 
section. In addition, business support such as experienced advice can provide 
valuable help geared towards accelerating the venture’s learning curve. By enjoying 
business support services, the incubatees will be able to make better and faster 
decisions, which results in higher firm performance (Eisenhardt, 1989). Furthermore, 
training sessions on relevant topics can contribute to increase the ventures’ human 
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capital and therefore have a potential impact on their development and performance 
(Colombo and Grilli, 2005; Davidsson and Honig, 2003).  
Business support is an integral part of business incubation and arguably its most 
complex dimension. Previous work on business support identified four typical 
services: coaching, training, business plan support and direct subsidies. Coaching is 
often referred as the most important service business incubators can provide to their 
tenants (Hansen et al., 2000; Mian, 1996). Within a coaching program, each incubatee 
is assigned one coach when admitted to the incubator, either free of charge or for a 
fee. Meeting with the coach can be compulsory or on demand. BIs which do not 
possess in-house coaching expertise may facilitate access to a coach through their 
network of contacts. Coaching has already been found in literature as critical to 
tenants’ timely graduation (Peters et al., 2004) and as having an impact on firm 
development (cf. Robson and Bennett, 2000). 
Training is often available within BIs (Aerts et al., 2007; Barrow, 2001). Training 
tools are less interactive and customized than coaching sessions. Training tools range 
from a training session on a specific topic to newsletters or access to common 
communication platforms. Peña (2004) found training within BIs to have a positive 
influence on tenants’ performance. Writing a business plan is a conventional activity 
for nascent companies. Also, young start-ups often need to update their business 
plans as this is an often seen tool to gain access to potential investors (e.g. Delmar 
and Shane, 2003). BIs were found to provide assistance in business plan writing, 
particular when they include idea development in their activities (Peña, 2004). Lastly, 
BIs can also provide direct subsidies to companies (Peña, 2004). 
Access to networks 
Access to professional business services or financial resources via networks of 
professional contacts is also part of the incubator concept (Bøllingtoft and Ulhøi, 
2005; Hansen et al., 2000). Access to networks stimulates external collaborations. Yet 
the incubation management should only connect tenants to the adequate networks of 
suppliers, costumer or investors after carefully understanding their needs (Lee and 
Osteryoung, 2004). Empirical evidence suggests that access to networks is critical for 
the development of tenant companies (McAdam and McAdam, 2008). Access to 
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financial resources is often offered by business incubators (Aerts et al., 2007). 
Connections with business angel networks and venture capital firms are important 
means of providing financial resources during early stages of tenants’ development.  
The concept behind the idea of compensating for a lack of resources using networks 
is social capital (e.g. Portes, 1998). New firms seldom have access to established 
networks to compensate their lack of human and financial resources. Previous work 
provided empirical evidence of the important role of social capital in building human 
capital (Coleman, 1988) and its impacts on firm performance (Davidsson and Honig, 
2003; Yli-Renko et al., 2001). Accessing professional business services via networks 
is commonly out of reach for new young firms. For instance, a venture trying to gain 
access to professional advice on a specific field of IP expertise might fail to do so 
because it does not have enough financial means to pay high consultancy fees.  
New firms often need external finance for development. Typical source of capital for 
new firms are business angels, venture capital firms or public subsidies (Clarysse and 
Bruneel, 2007). Among those, venture capital has an important influence on the 
professionalization of the venture. Venture capitalists typically have a control 
function, supervising the firm’s activities to ensure their own investment as well as a 
support function to support the growth of their portfolio companies. As a result, 
venture capitalists contribute to the firm’s development by covering their financial 
needs as well as professionalizing organizational structure and managerial processes 
(Hellmann and Puri, 2002). 
2.3 Incubatee selection strategy 
Selection criteria and exit policy are among the most important management features 
of business incubators. (Aerts et al., 2007; Lumpkin and Ireland, 1988). These 
procedures impact the population of incubated companies as well as the effectiveness 
of the process of incubation itself. New firm’s needs vary according to their 
development (e.g. Kazanjian, 1988; Vohora et al., 2004). Therefore, the more 
heterogeneous the population of a BI is, the more difficult it will be to provide them 
all with the appropriate business support portfolio and access to a useful network of 
contacts. Selection criteria typically include financial ratios (liquidity, profitability), 
personal traits of the entrepreneurial team (skills, experience) and market factors 
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(business plan, innovativeness of product or service) (Aerts et al., 2007; Lumpkin and 
Ireland, 1988). More recently, Aerts et al. (2007) found that the more balanced the 
selection process is in terms of those selection factors, the better tenants will perform. 
3 Research Design 
3.1 Empirical setting 
We investigated a total of 12 BIs located in six Northwestern European countries. All 
BIs were part of Nensi – North European Network of Service Incubators, an EU 
funded project which ran from 2005 until 2008. Based on our definition of TI, we 
found 5 TIs and 7 NTBIs which allowed us to have two equally large groups of BIs 
(Table 2). 
++ PUT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE ++ 
The TIs in our sample have similar characteristics. All of them were founded by 
universities and are still located within their premises. The exceptions are Emergence 
and the TechnologiePark Münster which are located closely to university campus and 
research institutions. However, these two TIs were explicitly established to support 
regionally the creation and development of high-tech companies. All TIs show a clear 
mission towards the support of technology based ventures. NTBIs in our sample are 
also similar among themselves. Promoted by other organizations than research 
universities and located in urban locations, NTBIs do not show any particular focus 
on supporting technology based ventures. The exception is the BTC which is located 
close to a university campus and has among its shareholders a technical research-
oriented university. Yet its mission is not clearly directed at supporting new 
technology based ventures but rather service companies (Table 2). 
3.2 Methodology of data collection 
During the Nensi project, we collected data on both business incubators as well as 
their tenants (for a detailed description of both questionnaires and the monitoring tool 
see Jenniskens, 2006). The questionnaire sent to business incubation managers 
included questions on their mission, strategy, focus, stakeholders, university linkages 
and location. Furthermore, other information on operational features such as tenants’ 
10/26 
profile, cost structure and business services portfolio was also part of the survey. We 
triangulated our data with complementary data gathered during site visits (Yin, 2003). 
Site visits included interviews with the incubation managers and other key staff. 
These interviews were semi-structured and the script based mostly on the analysis of 
the returned questionnaires. This allowed us also to clarify response in the 
questionnaires and to confirm some of the data already collected by alternative 
wording of the same questions (Fowler, 1995). 
The questionnaire sent to tenants contained questions on the several dimensions of 
business incubation. An initial version of the tenants’ questionnaire was used as script 
for semi-structured interviews to tenants of a selected BI. This procedure enabled us 
to assess the time needed to fill out the questionnaire as well as to correct some 
ambiguities in the questionnaires (Dillman et al., 2008). We asked tenants about the 
availability of infrastructure, business support services and access to networks within 
their respective BI. Demographic data such as age of venture, age at entry, sector of 
activity and teams’ experience was also collected. Data on tenants was collected by 
incubator staff. We asked the incubation managers or other key staff within the 
incubator to manage the data collection process in each incubator. This way we 
covered a bigger sample of tenants and saved time during data collection. The 
incubator managers were duly prepared by the first author to carry this task and 
counted on his constant support while collecting data. From the initial call to 354 
companies, 101 returned valid questionnaires (29%) (Table 3).  
++ PUT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE ++ 
3.3 Variables 
Business services 
BI services were operationalized using dummy variables for each service within each 
dimension discussed in section 2.2. We investigated a total of nine business 
incubation services. In the questionnaires, we asked tenants about the availability of 
each of the nine services. We interpret positive answers as available services which 
are therefore used. Tenants who report not knowing whether the service is available 
are certainly not using it. Infrastructure was measured asking tenants about 
availability of space and shared resources. Under business support services we put 
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internal coaching, training, business plan writing and direct subsidies. Access to 
networks was measured using the variables external coaching, brokerage and 
seed/venture capital. 
Selection criteria and exit policy 
Selection criteria and exit policy were captured by using two variables for each. 
Selection criteria can be proxied by the entry age of tenants. Different entry age of 
tenants reflects different strategic orientation of the BIs. For instance, accepting older 
tenants implies a focus on supporting companies already established while admitting 
younger tenants means the BIs focuses on nascent companies. Additionally, we 
included a question on the difficulty to get accepted within the BI (dichotomous 
variable). This will approximate the extension of the selection procedure. Similarly, 
exit policy can proxied by the current tenants’ age. For entrance, older tenants imply a 
weak exit policy resulting in housing companies beyond the incubation age. 
Additionally, we asked tenants whether they know when to leave the incubator. 
Negative answer can be translated in lack of exit policy. 
Tenants’ characteristics 
Finally, we enquired on characteristics of the entrepreneurial teams. These include 
experience (in years), specific preparation in entrepreneurship, whether the company 
was founded by a team, current number of employees and if any member of the team 
had previous experience in starting businesses. 
3.4 Analysis 
Data analysis will consist of non-parametric independence tests between the two 
groups, TIs and NTBIs. We did not specifically craft any hypothesis since we set out 
to uncover the differences between the two kinds of BIs. In any case, it is exremelly 
difficult to hypothesise on theoretical grounds why any kind of BI would have a 
higher level or service provision. 
4 Results 
An important finding of this study is that TIs and BIs differ in two of those 
dimensions while being similar on the other. TIs provide almost all their tenants with 
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the infrastructure, business support services and access to networks while NTBIs only 
exhibit this in the infrastructure dimension. In fact, both types of incubators provide 
all their tenants with infrastructure, both space and some kind of shared resources. In 
the business support and access to networks dimensions, TIs show better levels of 
provision of services to their tenants than NTBIs. Although not covering the entirety 
of tenants, TIs provide business support services to around 90% of their population of 
housed firms. Similarly, TIs provide 90% of their tenants with access to network 
services. The exceptions are direct subsidies (business support) and seed/venture 
capital (access to networks) which are provided to less than 80% of the tenants. 
NTBIs score lower on both business support and access to networks dimensions. 
Business support services are provided to less than 70% of housed firms. Only 
training scores higher (77.5%); direct subsidies score much lower, however (48.4%). 
In terms of access to networks, only brokerage is provided to TIs’ comparable levels 
(more than 80%). External coaching and seed/venture capital are provided to less than 
half of NTBIs’ tenants. We performed nonparametric independence tests to 
investigate whether the differences are statistically significant. We found that, apart 
from infrastructure services and brokerage, levels of provision of services in any 
dimension are statistically significant (p value  0.05) (Table 4). 
++ PUT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE ++ 
++ PUT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE ++ 
Results also show statistically significant differences in selection criteria and exit 
policy variables between TIs and NTBIs (Table 5). TIs tend to select younger 
companies (average entry age = 0.76 years) and use a more sophisticated selection 
procedure. This is shown by the reduced proportion of their tenants who found it not 
difficult to get accepted (28.0%). Also, a larger proportion of companies is aware of 
when to leave the BI (34.7%) and tend to graduate timely (average current age = 3.02 
years). Conversely, NTBIs select much more mature companies (average entry age = 
3.02 years) which do not have any difficulty in getting accepted. 64.7% of NTBIs’ 
tenants found it not difficult at all to get accepted within the incubator. Furthermore, 
tenants do not have any obligation to leave (only 16.3% know when to leave the BI) 
13/26 
and are, on average, much older than the typical incubated company (average current 
age = 5.45 years). All differences are statistically significant (p value  0.05). 
In terms of tenants’ experience and background, our results show that TIs are 
attracting significantly more entrepreneurial teams than single entrepreneurs (p value 
 0.01), who also have more accumulated experience (p value  0.1). Yet no 
statistically significant differences are observed in terms of specific entrepreneurship 
background or experience in founding prior businesses. Finally, employment is 
approximately the same on average among both TI and NTBI tenants. The difference 
is not statistically significant. 
5 Discussion of results 
To uncover the difference between TIs and NTBIs, we compared their service 
provision level and their tenant selection and exit strategies. Statistically significant 
differences were found in every incubation dimension apart from infrastructure (both 
premises and shared resources) and brokerage, a service part of the access to 
networks dimension. It is not surprising that both types of BIs provide the same level 
of infrastructure. Although the concept of virtual incubation has been gaining 
notoriety as a way to support new ventures without physical premises (Nowak and 
Grantham, 2000), most BIs are still property based (Phan et al., 2005). Additionally, 
our survey was only administered to companies who were physically located within 
the incubators. To our knowledge none of the BIs in our sample had any virtual 
incubatees besides the ones located within the physical space (cf. Durão et al., 2005). 
The fact that brokerage was also not statistically significant suggests that NTBIs 
provide the same level of brokerage as TIs. In other words, NTBIs act at least as good 
brokers, providing the relevant contacts to their tenants. 
We also investigated the differences in selection strategy. Results show that TIs differ 
significantly from their counterparts. TIs have stricter and more sophisticated 
selection procedures while showing also exit policies in line with typical BIs’ 
benchmarks (EC, 2002). The fact that NTBIs have less strict selection criteria and 
slack exit policies can be the reason behind the observed lower shares of tenants using 
services. Firms’ needs vary throughout their various stages of development 
(Kazanjian, 1988; Vohora et al., 2004). Not surprisingly, NTBIs housing older 
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tenants show different patterns of service usage than TIs housing younger ones 
tenants. BI services are especially designed to support companies during their first 
states of development. Due to strong industry associations, such as the NBIA in the 
United States of the UKBI in the United Kingdom, it is likely that BIs establish the 
same kind of services. Unfortunately, this might happen regardless of specific 
contingencies of each BI and its target population of tenants. Services such as 
coaching are crucial for nascent companies, become less important for start ups and 
potentially lose its utility for more mature companies (McAdam and McAdam, 2008). 
Services such as seed/venture capital, writing business plan are only meaningful for 
nascent companies. Still, NTBIs still have significant proportions of tenants using 
other more general services such as training and internal coaching. This suggests that 
NTBIs might have a diverse portfolio of tenants in terms of age and stage of 
development. 
The reason behind weak selection criteria and slack exit policies might be the built-in 
potential conflict between the profitability of a property based BI and the longer term 
goals of support technology based ventures (OECD, 1997). In our sample, most 
NTBIs are owned and promoted by private organizations and therefore less likely to 
value technology based venture creation activities above generating revenue. This is 
also visible in the average age of tenants. Most NTBIs are less than 10 years old 
which leads us to think that selection criteria and exit policies were never exclusively 
focusing in technology based ventures. In fact, it is known that some BIs accept 
accountants, financial services and insurance companies (OECD, 1997) while 
showing a reduced number of the type of companies they claim providing support to 
(Quintas et al., 1992; Ratinho, 2007).  
TIs attract more experienced people in terms of work experience as well as a bigger 
share of entrepreneurial teams as opposed to single entrepreneurs. The differences 
between serial entrepreneurs and specific entrepreneurial preparation are not 
statistically significant. The positive role of teams in technology based firms has been 
extensively discussed (e.g. Colombo and Grilli, 2005). It would be therefore 
expectable that TIs, which focus specifically in supporting technology based ventures, 
would end up having more entrepreneurial teams than NTBIs. Similarly, it has been 
shown that TIs attract more experienced entrepreneurial teams’ (Colombo and 
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Delmastro, 2002). The average number of employers of tenants is only marginally 
higher in NTBIs than it is in TIs. This is unsurprising since it is likely that younger 
companies grow faster that more mature ones. At the same time, it might mean that 
companies within NTBIs are not actually growing. The infrastructure of a BI is 
typically designed for small nascent companies offering office space for small 
entrepreneurial teams. Therefore, NTBIs’ tenants do not grow because they are 
located within a BI; or due to their sluggish growth combined with slack exit policies, 
they are still located within a BI. 
6 Conclusions and Implications 
Taken together, our results suggest that TIs provide better services to their tenants 
than their counterparts NTBIs. Better to the extent that the services cover a bigger 
proportion of tenants and can be therefore seen as more adequate. These high levels 
of provisions of services suggest that tenants companies are being properly incubated 
and, arguably, their chances of survival and growth perspectives will be higher. 
Furthermore, companies housed within TIs are more likely to be technology based 
and access more new knowledge since they are closely linked institutionally to 
sources of knowledge creation. Finally, our study suggests that there is a strong 
differentiating effect of choosing a certain strategic positioning for the BI. This 
impacts some of its most fundamental operational characteristics such as levels of 
service providing and tenants’ profile. 
Our results have implications for BI managers, prospective tenants and policy 
makers. BI management has to take in account the impact of managerial practices n 
the population of tenants as well as in the consequent levels of business services 
provision. Well defined selection criteria and strong exit policies are determinant to 
the share of companies willing and needing to enjoy every dimension of business 
incubation beyond infrastructure. If older and diverse tenants are present, business 
services are, arguably, less needed. BI management might look for alternative 
strategies to provide business support services to the tenants who still need them to 
some extent (outsourcing instead of in-house expertise, service level agreements, 
among others). Prospective tenants have also now an improved understanding on the 
profile of BIs to look for, according to their stage of development and need for 
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business support services. Not all firms will need an TI environment to develop. 
Finally, policy makers can also better design BIs and their features according to 
specific policy aims. When economic growth through transferring of new knowledge 
to markets using new firms, TIs are bound to be better tools than their counterparts, 
NTBIs. 
 
 
1 Exception include Mian (1996) and Chan & Lau (2004) who provide different operationalizations of 
incubation. Yet Mian did not include intangible services such as coaching or venture capital as part of 
the analysis; Chan & Lau assess jointly incubators managers, graduate firms and tenants on their 
perception of success factors of university based incubators. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1 – Definitions of Business Incubation 
National Business Incubation Association. Business incubation is a business support process 
that accelerates the successful development of start-up and fledgling companies by providing 
entrepreneurs with an array of targeted resources and services. These services are usually 
developed or orchestrated by incubator management and offered both in the business incubator 
and through its network of contacts. A business incubator’s main goal is to produce successful 
firms that will leave the program financially viable and freestanding. These incubator graduates 
have the potential to create jobs, revitalize neighborhoods, commercialize new technologies, and 
strengthen local and national economies (NBIA, 2007). 
United Kingdom Business Incubation. Business Incubation is a unique and highly flexible 
combination of business development processes, infrastructure and people, designed to nurture 
and grow new and small businesses by supporting them through the early stages of development 
and change (UKBI, 2007). 
European Commission. A business incubator is an organization that accelerates and 
systematises the process of creating successful enterprises by providing them with a 
comprehensive and integrated range of support, including: Incubator space, business support 
services, and clustering and networking opportunities. 
By providing their clients with services on a 'one-stop-shop’ basis and enabling overheads to be 
reduced by sharing costs, business incubators significantly improve the survival and growth 
prospects of new start-ups. 
A successful business incubator will generate a steady flow of new businesses with above 
average job and wealth creation potential. Differences in stakeholder objectives for incubators, 
admission and exit criteria, the knowledge intensity of projects, and the precise configuration of 
facilities and services, will distinguish one type of business incubator from another (EC, 2002). 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Technology incubators are a 
specific type of business incubator: property-based ventures which provide a range of services 
to entrepreneurs and start-ups, including physical infrastructure (office space, laboratories), 
management support (business planning, training, marketing), technical support (researchers, 
data bases), access to financing (venture capital funds, business angel networks), legal 
assistance (licensing, intellectual property) and networking (with other incubators and 
government services) (OECD, 1997). 
 
 
 
22/26 
Table 2 – Typology of the researched business incubators 
Country Incubator Mission statement University linkages Location Focus 
Netherlands BTC “Focus on knowledge intensive 
companies and organizations 
specialized in “high-tech” or high 
value services” 
(quotes on the original) 
The University of Twente (research 
university) and Saxion (applied 
sciences university) are among the 
shareholders. 
Campus / Business and Science 
Park 
Mixed use 
 Campus Business 
Centre 
No clear mission found. 
Campus assumes itself as office rental 
while mentioning network of 
professionals for providing support to 
early stage ventures.  
Owned and promoted mostly by 
ROC van Twente (Regional 
Educational Centre) 
Urban Mixed use 
 Masterdam 
Ondernemers Centrum  
Masterdam positions itself in bridging 
the gap between the education at ROC 
ASA and companies. 
Owned and promoted mostly by 
ROC ASA (Regional Educational 
Centre) 
Campus Mixed use 
UK EPIC - Eliot Park 
Innovation Centre 
No clear mission found. If you are a 
technology and knowledge based small 
to medium sized enterprise then EPIC 
is the ideal environment for you to 
grow and develop, although all 
enquiries are considered” 
Promoted by Coventry University 
Enterprises, a for profit subsidiary 
of Coventry University. 
Urban Mixed use 
 EMIN - Innovation 
Centre 
Focused in supporting high-tech new 
ventures. 
Founded by DeMontfort University 
(research university) 
Campus Technology based 
 EMIN - Sparkhouse 
Studios 
“Help new-start businesses grow and 
develop by providing them with the 
best possible advice and support 
available”. Focus in the field of 
creative industries. 
Founded by the University of 
Lincoln. 
Campus Technology based 
Ireland DCEB - Guinness 
Enterprise Centre 
“To provide incubator space (…) to 
new and established small businesses, 
primarily in software services oriented 
businesses, light hi-tech prototype 
engineering and 
international/technological traded 
services, E-commerce, multi-media, 
internet and mobile software 
development” 
No linkages found. Urban Mixed use 
 DCEB - iCELT No specific mission found for the Founded and promoted by the Campus Mixed Use 
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Country Incubator Mission statement University linkages Location Focus 
business incubator. The BI is however 
“home to a number of knowledge 
intensive start-up companies working 
in the areas of finance, education and 
learning technologies”. 
National College of Ireland 
(teaching oriented university) 
 
 DCEB - Terenure 
Enterprise Board 
“To provide practical, realistic support 
and training to all members in the 
community, with priority for 
disadvantaged members.” 
The Community Enterprise Society 
Limited is a voluntary organisation 
with charitable status established in 
1984. 
Urban Mixed use 
France Emergence Emergence was created as a “tool (…) 
for company creation, aimed at 
supporting young technology based 
companies to start, develop and 
survive.” 
Although geographically located 
close to Universities and Research 
Centers, the centre is not formally 
connected to any. 
Campus / Business Park Technology based 
Focused on young 
ventures 
 Normandie Incubation Housing and support of “innovative 
enterprise creation projects based in 
Lower Normandy.” 
Founded by the University of Caen 
Lower Normandy, the National 
Graduate School of Engineering in 
Caen and the one public research 
laboratory. 
Campus Technology based 
Focused on pre starters 
Germany TechnologiePark 
Münster 
“Promotion of innovations and 
technologies and the consultancy in the 
formation and growth of technology-
oriented firms.” 
Although geographically located 
close to Universities and Research 
Centers, the centre is not formally 
connected to any. 
Urban Technology based 
 
Table 3 – General characteristics and data availability of the researched business 
incubators 
Country Incubator Year of 
Foundation 
Size 
(m2) 
# 
companies 
# valid 
answers 
Netherlands BTC 1982 4700 68 11 16% 
 Campus Business 
Centre 
2005 5000 49 18 37% 
 ROC ASA 2006 300 10 4 40% 
UK CUTP - EPIC - 
Eliot Park 
Innovation Centre 
-  17 2 12% 
 EMIN - 
Innovation Centre 
2001 640 18 6 33% 
 EMIN - 
Sparkhouse 
Studios 
2003 320 10 6 60% 
Ireland DCEB - Guinness 
Enterprise Centre 
1997 4000 67 7 10% 
 DCEB - iCELT 2004 1300 13 3 23% 
 DCEB - Terenure 
Enterprise Board 
1985 750 25 6 24% 
France Emergence 1995 650 16 13 81% 
 Normandie 
Incubation 
2000 300 19 14 74% 
Germany TechnologiePark 
Münster 
1985 6900 42 11 26% 
Total    354 101 29% 
 
 
Table 4 – Service availability in the researched business incubators 
Service (%) N TIs (N=50) NTBIs 
(N=51) 
p value 
Infrastructure     
Space 101 100.0 100.0 n.s. 
Shared resources 101 100.0 100.0 n.s. 
Business support     
25/26 
26/26 
Internal coaching 79 93.9 71.7  0.05 
BP support 59 88.5 60.6  0.05 
Training 73 93.9 77.5  0.05 
Direct subsidies 49 78.4 48.4  0.05 
Access to networks     
External coaching 67 90.5 50.0  0.01 
Brokerage 58 90.5 81.1 n.s. 
Seed/venture capital 51 76.5 38.2  0.05 
 
Table 5 – Employment, selection criteria, exit policy and entrepreneurial teams’ 
background in the researched business incubators 
 N TIs (N=50) NTBIs 
(N=51) 
p value 
Employment 99 3.08 3.33 n.s. 
Selection criteria     
Average entry age (years) 100 0.76 3.02  0.01 
% of not difficult entrance 86 28.0 64.7  0.05 
Exit policy     
Average current age 
(years) 
101 3.02 5.45  0.05 
% of knowing when to 
leave 
98 34.7 16.3  0.05 
Entrepreneurial teams 
background 
    
% team start 100 72.0 42.0  0.01 
% serial entrepreneurs 96 29.2 29.2 n.s. 
% entrepreneurship 
preparation 
99 40.0 46.9 n.s. 
Average accumulated 
years of experience (years) 
92 21.0 14.0  0.1 
 
